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I. Automobile Insurance 
A. The Duty To Investigate Insurability 
In recent years, the California Supreme Court has time and 
again stressed the obligation of reasonable conduct that in-
surers owe to the public as well as to their insureds. This can 
be seen in the Court's decision in Gray v. Zurich Insurance 
Company/ where the Court held that the duty to defend under 
a liability policy was measured not on the mere objective 
standard of the language in the policy, but rather on the sub-
jective standard of whether the insured might reasonably ex-
pect that he was entitled to a defense. Justice Tobriner's de-
cision in Gray relied heavily on the doctrine of the adhesion 
contract, holding that in view of the disparate bargaining 
status between insurer and insured, the Court had to ascertain 
that meaning of the contract which the insured would rea-
sonably expect. The opinion concluded: 
In summary, the individual consumer in the highly or-
ganized and integrated society of today must necessarily 
rely upon institutions devoted to the public service to 
perform the basic functions which they undertake. At 
the same time the consumer does not occupy a sufficiently 
strong economic position to bargain with such institu-
tions as to specific clauses of their contracts of perform-
ance, and in any event, piecemeal negotiation would 
sacrifice the advantage of uniformity. Hence the courts 
in the field of insurance contracts have tended to require 
that the insurer render the basic insurance protection 
which it has held out to the insured. This obligation be-
comes especially manifest in the case in which the insurer 
has attempted to limit the principal coverage by an un-
clear exclusionary clause. We test the alleged limitation 
in the light of the insured's reasonable expectation of 
coverage; that test compels the indicated outcome of the 
present litigation.a 
1. 65 Ca1.2d 263, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104, 2. 65 Cal.2d 263, 280, 54 Cal. Rptr. 
419 P.2d 168 (1966). 104, 115, 419 P.2d 168, 179. 
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The concept that language in insurance policies and con-
duct of insurers should be interpreted and judged by the stand-
ard of reasonableness in view of the public nature of an insur-
ance contract was, of course, not new to either Justice To-
briner or to the Court. Four years before Gray, Justice 
Tobriner, in Steven v. Fidelity and Casualty Co. of New 
York,s applied the adhesion contract doctrine in interpreting 
a policy of airplane trip insurance sold by means of a vending 
machine. Here too, the Court determined that the insured's 
reasonable expectation in taking out the insurance was to ob-
tain insurance protection for the entire trip, and that a policy 
issued to cover the trip would likewise cover reasonable sub-
stituted transportation necessitated by emergencies such as 
weather conditions and mechanical failure. In holding that 
the insurer was bound to provide the coverage that the insured 
might reasonably expect at the time he purchased the policy, 
Justice Tobriner stated: 
We must view the instant claim in the composite of its 
special and unique circumstances. To equate the bar-
gaining table, where each clause is the subject of debate, 
to an automatic vending machine, which issues a policy 
before it can even be read, is to ignore basic distinctions. 
The proposition that the precedents must be viewed in the 
light of the imperatives of the age of the machine has be-
come almost axiomatic. Here the age of the machine is 
no mere abstraction; it presents itself in the shape of an 
instrument for the mass distribution of standard con-
tracts. The exclusionary clause of that contract, upon 
which the insurance company relies, is an unexpected 
one. Its application in some circumstances would be 
unconscionable. It is placed in an inconspicuous posi-
tion of the document. In view of all these character-
istics its rigid application would cast an unexpected bur-
den upon the traveling public and would prefer formality 
of phrase to the reality of the transaction.4 
3. 58 Cal.2d 862, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172, 4. 58 Cal.2d 862, 884, 27 Cal. Rptr. 
377 P.2d 284 (1962). 172, 186, 377 P.2d 284, 298. 
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Justice Tobriner's devotion to the concept of reasonableness 
in interpretation of insurance policies was further defined and 
enunciated in Insurance Company of North America v. Elec-
tronic Purification Company,5 reported in last year's edition of 
Cal Law-Trends and Developments.6 Once again, the Court 
rejected an interpretation of a policy exclusion that would 
have destroyed the insured's principal objective in purchasing 
the insurance. In language that bears repeating, since the 
people who write insurance policies seem to be totally ob-
livious to the problems they create, Justice Tobriner pleaded: 
The instant case presents yet another illustration of the 
dangers of the present complex structuring of insurance 
policies. Unfortunately the insurance industry has be-
come addicted to the practice of building into policies 
one condition or exception upon another in the shape of 
a linguistic Tower of Babel. We join other courts in 
decrying a trend which both plunges the insured into a 
state of uncertainty and burdens the judiciary with the 
task of resolving it. We reiterate our plea for clarity 
and simplicity in policies that fulfill so important a pub-
lic service.7 
The most important decision in the insurance field in 1969 
was Barrera v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Company,S another Tobriner opinion enunciating the require-
ment of reasonableness by insurers in fulfilling their respon-
sibility to the pUblic. The Court held that an automobile 
liability insurer must undertake a reasonable investigation of 
the insured's insurability within a reasonable period of time 
from the acceptance of the application and the issuance of the 
policy. This duty directly inures to the benefit of third persons 
injured by the insured; where the insurer has breached the 
duty, it will be precluded from rescinding its policy on the 
ground of misrepresentation or fraud by its insured in procur-
5. 67 Cal.2d 679, 63 Cal. Rptr. 382, 7. 67 Cal.2d 679, 691, 63 Cal. Rptr. 
433 P.2d 174 (1967). 382, 390, 433 P.2d 174, 182 (1967). 
6. Seligson, INSURANCE, Cal Law- 8. 71 Cal.2d 659, 79 Cal. Rptr. 106, 
Trends and Developments 1969, pp. 456 P.2d 674 (1969). 
493, 505. 
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ing the policy. The Court analogized the insurer's duty to un-
dertake a reasonable investigation of the insured's insurability 
after issuance of the policy to its extracontractual duty to act 
promptly on applications. It rejected the argument that the 
injured person "stands in the shoes" of the insured; and it 
further held that on satisfaction of a judgment attained by 
the injured third person, the insurer possesses a remedy 
against the insured for his misrepresentations. 
The Court of Appeal in Barrera had held that an auto-
mobile liability insurer in California could not rescind its pol-
icy, no matter what the facts, and that its only remedy was to 
cancel the policy on giving the requisite notice. This would 
have placed an impossible burden on insurers, since it does 
take a fair amount of time to get information from the De-
partment of Motor Vehicles regarding an individual's past 
driving record. The Supreme Court's decision rejected the 
Court of Appeal reasoning, and held: 
If the insurer does undertake a reasonable investigation 
of insurability, it retains the statutory right granted in 
section 650 of the Insurance Code to declare the rescis-
sion of the policy because of the material misrepresenta-
tion of the insured. When the insurer fails, however, to 
conduct such a reasonable investigation it cannot assert 
such a right of rescission. The insurer cannot complain 
of the denial of the statutory right, when its conduct is 
culpable and it directly contributes to the presence on the 
highway of a financially irresponsible motorist. 9 
In this case, State Farm's policy was in effect for one year, 
seven months before the accident and two years before it 
rescinded the policy. It had paid a prior claim involving the 
comprehensive coverage. In a remarkable show of judicial 
restraint, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial 
court for a determination of whether the insurer had con-
ducted a reasonable investigation within a reasonable period 
of time. The Court stated that factors to be taken into ac-
9. 71 Cal.2d 659, 678, 79 Cal. Rptr. 
106, 114, 456 P.2d 674, 682 (1969). 
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count in assessing the reasonableness of the insurer's course of 
conduct in failing to investigate the insured's driving record 
were, inter alia, the cost of obtaining the information from the 
Department of Motor Vehicles, the availability of this infor-
mation from the department or elsewhere, and the general ad-
ministrative burden of making such an investigation. These 
factors must be weighed against the importance of the protec-
tion of innocent members of the public against the conse-
quences of automobile owners driving with voidable liability 
policies. 
Of course, if the obligation imposed upon insurers by Bar-
rera is to be fair and just, it necessarily requires that insurers 
be able to obtain the information they need in order to deter-
mine the truth or falsity of the information that the insured 
has given to them. Claims have been raised in the past that 
information regarding an individual's prior driving record 
should be made confidential and not available to insurers. In 
1968, Vehicle Code section 1806 was amended so that the 
Department of Motor Vehicles only maintains records show-
ing the driver's convictions and the traffic accidents for which 
he was cited for a violation under the Vehicle Code. If, for 
one reason or another, an individual has not been convicted of 
a charged offense, the department will presumably not main-
tain or disseminate information regarding the incident. Like-
wise, if the driver was not cited by the investigating officer, he 
may be able to misrepresent his prior accident record; and 
the insurer will have no means for obtaining information re-
garding the misrepresentation even if it undertakes its investi-
gation in accordance with the Barrera decision. Under Vehi-
cle Code section 1807, the Department is not required to 
maintain records relating to drivers of motor vehicles after the 
records are, in the opinion of the director, no longer necessary, 
except that records of convictions shall be maintained so long 
as they may form the basis of license suspensions or revoca-
tions as prior convictions, or together with other records of 
conviction constitute a person a "negligent driver." If the 
Department advances its time table for destruction of records 
in accordance with section 1807, the carriers may find them-
selves unable to check the truth or falsity of the insured's ap-
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plication. Since the obligations imposed by Barrera will re-
sult in increased costs that will be borne by the general public, 
it is imperative that the public preserve the sources of infor-
mation available to insurers. The rule of reason is a two-way 
street; certainly this would seem to be a reasonable require-
ment if Barrera is to be fairly applied. 
B. Breach of Cooperation Clause 
In the 1963 case of Campbell v. Allstate Insurance Co. lO 
the State Supreme Court overruled prior cases that held that 
prejudice was presumed from an insured's violation of a co-
operative clause. The Court further held that the burden of 
proving that a breach of the cooperation clause resulted in sub-
stantial prejudice was on the insurer. In Billington v. Inter-
insurance Exchange of Southern California,l1 the Court ex-
tended Campbell by ruling that in order for the insurer to 
show that it was prejudiced by the failure of the insured to 
cooperate in his defense, it must establish at the very least 
that if the cooperation clause had not been breached there 
was a substantial likelihood the trier of fact would have found 
in the insured's favor. "A less stringent standard," the Court 
stated "would not be consonant with our holding in Camp-
bell."l2 
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the Billington deci-
sion is not the holding but rather the fact that the Court reject-
ed so many arguments advanced by both the plaintiff and the 
various attorneys appearing as amici curiae on behalf of the 
plaintiff. First, the Court held that the insurer's refusal to 
accept settlement proposals made by the plaintiff within the 
policy limits did not estop the insurer from relying on the de-
fense of the insured's breach of the cooperation clause, es-
pecially where no bad faith was shown in the insurer's han-
dling of the insured's defense or in its failure to negotiate a 
compromise settlement. The Court rejected plaintiff's reli-
10. 60 Cal.2d 303, 32 Cal. Rptr.827, 12. 71 Ca1.2d -, -, 79 Cal. Rptr 
384 P.2d 155 (1963). 326, 331, 456 P.2d 982, 987. 
11. 71 Ca1.2d -, 79 Cal. Rptr. 326, 
456 P.2d 982 (1969). 
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ance on a statement in Crisci v. Security Insurance Compani3 
that perhaps an insurer could be liable for any judgment 
exceeding the policy limits if it refuses an offer of settlement 
within those limits. It would be unwarranted in applying the 
proposed rule where the insurer was unable to maintain any 
defense to the action on behalf of the insured as a result of the 
insured's failure to cooperate in his defense. Next, the Court 
held that just because the insured was covered under the 
assigned risk plan, the insurer would not be precluded from 
raising his violation of the cooperation clause as a defense. 
In this regard, Justice Mosk, speaking for the Court in Billing-
ton, stated: 
This contention is based upon the erroneous premise 
that assigned risk policies are the equivalent of com-
pulsory insurance.14 
The Court also rejected plaintiff's reliance on the provisions of 
the Financial Responsibility Law,15 noting: 
If a court finds that there was a substantial likelihood 
that the insured would have prevailed had he cooperated 
in his defense, there is little danger that an innocent plain-
tiff will be denied recovery by the insurer's reliance upon 
the cooperation clause. 16 
Amici curiae claimed that the insurer's attempt to disclaim 
liability because of an insured's breach of a cooperation clause 
amounted to a cancellation and that a cancellation may not 
affect accidents which occurred prior thereto. The Court 
disposed of this argument with the terse comment that "no 
case to our knowledge has viewed the breach of such a clause 
as a cancellation. 00l7 Similarly, the Court rejected the con-
tention that a cooperation clause defense was in derogation of 
the coverage required by Vehicle Code sections 16451 and 
16452 and Wildman v. Government Employees' Insurance 
13. 66 Cal.2d 425, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 16. 71 Cal.2d -, -, 79 Cal. Rptr. 
426 P.2d 173 (1967). 326, 335, 456 P.2d 982, 991 (1969). 
14. 71 Cal.2d -, -, 79 Cal. Rptr. 17. 71 Cal.2d -, -, 79 Cal. Rptr. 
326, 332, 456 P.2d 982, 988 (1969). 326, 334, 456 P.2d 982, 990. 
15. Vehicle Code §§ 16000 et seq. 
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Company. IS It also held that even if the insurer has certified 
to the Department of Motor Vehicles within twenty days fol-
lowing the accident that its policy was in effect at the time of 
the accident, it may still rely on the cooperation clause where 
discovery of the breach of cooperation could not be made 
within the 20-day period. Finally, the Court held that if the 
insurer has been found to encourage noncooperation or to 
have shown lack of diligence in seeking the insured's presence 
to participate in his defense, it will be precluded from relying 
on the cooperation clause. 
As indicated above, this writer believes that it is significant 
that the Court rejected so many technical arguments advanced 
by counsel for the claimant, while at the same time adopting 
a rule that justly places on the insurer the burden of showing 
that the insured's failure to cooperate prejudiced the company 
in its effort to persuade the jury or judge to find in the insured's 
favor in the prior action. It would appear that the Court is 
willing to take a realistic view toward the problems of insurers 
and their insureds, and will not accept every wild argument 
advanced by claimants' counsel. This, of course, is befitting 
a Court that has rejected so many technical defenses advanced 
on behalf of insurers in recent years. 
C. Premiums-Recitals as to Payment 
It has been said that hard cases make bad law. It might 
also be observed that hard decisions sometimes spur legislators 
to change the law .19 
18. 48 Cal.2d 31, 307 P.2d 359 
(1957). 
19. Last year in this article (Selig-
son, INSURANCE, Cal Law-Trends and 
Developments 1969, p. 493, we noted 
legislative action following reviewing 
court decisions in Abbott v. Interinsur-
ance Exchange, 260 Cal. App.2d 528, 
67 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1968) and Lopez v. 
State Farm Fire and Casualty Com-
pany, 250 Cal. App.2d 210, 58 Cal. 
Rptr. 243 (1967). In each case, there 
was a clear disagreement between the 
CAL LAW 1970 
court and the Legislature over the prop-
er public policy for the state. Abbott 
dealt with an exclusion in an automo-
bile liability policy of a person desig-
nated by name (which the court held 
to be invalid and the Legislature re-
validated) and Lopez involved an ex-
clusion to uninsured motorist coverage 
of a relative who owned an automobile 
but did not take out coverage to pro-
tect either himself or the public (the 
court could find no statutory authoriza-
tion for the exclusion, and so the Leg-
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During 1969, the most striking example of action and re-
action by the State Supreme Court and the Legislature arose 
out of a decision by the Supreme Court involving a recital of 
payment of the premium in an insurance policy, where the in-
sured had not in fact paid the premium. In Sawyer v. State 
Farm Fire and Casualty Company,20 the Court held that a 
clause in an automobile liability policy delivered uncondi-
tionally to the insured, stating that the policy was "in con-
sideration of the premium paid," constituted an "acknowledg-
ment" within the meaning of Insurance Code section 484 that 
the premium had been paid and that under the statute the 
acknowledgment was, in the absence of fraud, conclusive evi-
dence of its payment and precluded the insurer not only from 
claiming that the policy had not gone into effect at all, on the 
ground of nonpayment, but also from cancelling the policy on 
the same ground at any time during the premium period. The 
Court further held that the company was estopped from claim-
ing that it had canceled the policy prior to the accident for 
nonpayment of the premium. The trial court had properly 
refused to receive evidence of such attempted cancellation, 
where, although the insured had failed to comply with the 
terms of an extension of limited personal credit for such pay-
ment, the policy had been unconditionally delivered to him 
and contained an "acknowledgment" of the payment within 
the meaning of the statute. 
Justices McComb and Burke dissented, primarily on the 
basis that the insurer had a right, on proper notice before a 
loss, to exercise the cancellation right reserved to it in the 
policy. Justice McComb stated his view of the proper in-
terpretation of Insurance Code section 484, as follows: 
Rather, it appears to me from the clear language of the 
statute, that the Legislature intended to provide that 
if the receipt of premium is acknowledged in the policy, 
a binding insurance contract has come into existence even 
though (1) the policy provides that it shall not be bind-
ing until the premium is actually paid, and (2) the 
20. 69 Cal.2d 801, 73 Cal. Rptr. 
232, 447 P.2d 344 (1968). 
498 CAL LAW 1970 10
Cal Law Trends and Developments, Vol. 1970, Iss. 1 [1970], Art. 17
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/17
Insurance 
premium has not been paid. The section does not in any 
way indicate that such binding contract of insurance is 
immune from cancellation, when the right of cancellation 
has been reserved to the insurer in the policy.l 
Justice McComb's dissenting interpretation of the statute 
was promptly codified by the Legislature, which amended sec-
tion 484, to provide: 
An acknowledgment in a policy of the receipt of pre-
mium is conclusive evidence of its payment so far as 
to make the policy binding. Notwithstanding such ac-
knowledgment, a policy may be canceled effective at such 
times as otherwise permitted by law for nonpayment of 
all or any portion of the premium which is actually un-
paid if such cancellation right is reserved to the insurer 
in the policy. 
D. Uninsured Motorist Coverage 
Insurance Code section 11580.2, provides that no policy of 
motor vehicle liability insurance shall be issued or delivered in 
California to the owner or operator of a motor vehicle, or shall 
be issued or delivered by any insurer licensed in California 
upon any motor vehicle then principally used or principally 
garaged in California without the uninsured motorist coverage 
required by the statute, unless the insurer and named insured 
have agreed in writing to delete such coverage. In Modglin 
v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company,2 the 
court held that this provision applied not only to new policies 
but also to renewals of existing policies. Thus, where a policy 
was renewed on a motor vehicle "then principally used or 
principally garaged" in California, the statute provided unin-
sured motorist coverage as a matter of law unless the coverage 
had been waived by the named insured by an agreement in 
writing. The court felt that the limitation of the statute only 
to new policies would permit insurance carriers to circumvent 
1. 69 Cal.2d 801, 812, 73 Cal. Rptr. 2. 273 Cal. App. 2d -, 78 Cal. Rptr. 
232, 239, 447 P.2d 344, 351. See 1969 355 (1969). 
amendment, Stats. 1969, Ch. 536. 
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the statute by the mere expedient of renewing their policies 
instead of issuing new ones. 
The Legislature also acted in the same area by amending 
the statute so as to provide that the written agreement delet-
ing uninsured motorist coverage could be made either "prior 
to or subsequent to the issuance or renewal of a policy." In 
the past, some companies required the insured to sign a waiver 
with each renewal of the policy. Under the statutory change, 
it would seem that that is no longer necessary. Presumably, 
however, a waiver can be withdrawn by the insured 
with respect to subsequent renewals, so as to prevent re-
newal of the policy automatically carrying forward an earlier 
waIver. 
Several other statutory changes of significance were made 
in this field. Under the prior statute, a company could reduce 
payments made under uninsured motorist coverage by 
amounts paid or payable under automobile medical payments 
insurance. As of January 1, 1971, however, an insurer may 
deduct medical payments only from the damages which the 
insured is entitled to recover under the uninsured motorist 
coverage. Thus, if the insured's damages are $50,000 and his 
uninsured motorist coverage is $15,000, the insurer will not 
get the benefit of the reduction for medical payments coverage 
after the effective date of the statute. As can be seen, this stat-
utory change will be significant only in cases where the dam-
ages exceed the policy limits. This seems fair, since the theory 
against double recovery has no application in such cases. 
Under Insurance Code section 11580.5, no award made in 
an uninsured motorist arbitration proceeding shall be deemed 
to be res judicata or collateral estoppel in any court action 
which may be pending or brought by the insured against the 
owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle. In 1969, 
the Legislature adopted a conforming amendment to Insur-
ance Code section 11580.2 (f), so that an award or a judg-
ment confirming an award shall not be conclusive on any party 
in any action or proceeding between (1) the insured, his in-
surer, his legal representative, or his heirs and (2) the un-
insured motorist. 
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The statute of limitations for uninsured motorist proceed-
ings has been a trap for the unwary. Under Insurance Code 
section l1580.2(i), an insured who has an uninsured motorist 
claim has one year from the date of accident to either file suit 
for bodily injury against the uninsured motorist, or reach an 
agreement as to the amount due under the policy with the in-
surer, or formally institute arbitration proceedings. Many 
attorneys, representing minors, were not aware of the fact 
that the one-year limitation applied to all claimants, including 
minors; and this writer suspects that more than one legal mal-
practice claim has arisen because of this problem. In 1969, 
an effort was made to conform the statute of limitations for 
uninsured motorist claims to the regular rule set forth in the 
Code of Civil Procedure for injury actions, including the ex-
ception of time during which a person is under disability as 
provided in section 352. This attempt did not succeed. How-
ever, the Legislature did adopt Insurance Code section 
l1580.2(j), which provides that an uninsured motorist carrier 
whose insured has made a claim under the coverage, which 
is still pending, shall, at least 30 days before the expiration 
of the applicable statute of limitations, notify its insured in 
writing of the applicable statute. Failure of the insurer to 
provide this written notice operates to toll any applicable stat-
ute of limitation or other time limitation for a period of 30 
days from the date the written notice is actually given. Cer-
tainly, this is not a satisfactory solution to the problem. How-
ever, it does afford protection that did not previously exist. 
E. Loading and Unloading 
The courts in recent years have given increasing scope to 
the "loading and unloading" coverage contained in automobile 
liability insurance policies. This trend continued during 
1969. In Brunswig Wholesale Druggist v. Travelers Insur-
ance Company,3 a garbage truck driver, who was in the proc-
ess of collecting trash from Brunswig's waste well, was injured 
by the negligence of Brunswig's employee, who lost control of 
3. 273 Cal. App. 2d 11, 77 Cal. Rptr. 
859 (1969). 
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a metal cart while attempting to empty the cart into the open-
ing of the chute to the waste well. At the time of the accident, 
the driver was about twenty feet from the point where the 
truck was parked. Although the driver was not injured by 
anything used in loading the truck, the court held that the 
accident came within the "loading and unloading" coverage of 
defendant's truck policy. The court justified this on the basis 
that the duties of Brunswig's employee included the dumping 
of trash down the chute into the waste well; and that this was 
part of the "continuous process" by which the trash would be 
loaded from the well onto the truck. 
It seems that we are fast approaching the point where any 
injury to a delivery man or a truck driver will be covered under 
the truck policy. Under Brunswig, if you leave milk bottles 
in such a position that the milkman trips over them and is in-
jured, you would be covered under the milk company's truck 
policy. Query: What if your child leaves a skate in the same 
place and the milkman is injured? While that may not be part 
of the "continuous process" of loading or unloading, will a 
different result apply or will some court hold that the land-
owner's duty to keep the pathway free from objects is a "step 
necessary to accomplish the purpose for which the truck was 
being used,,4 so as to come within the truck policy? 
It may be that the answer to the above question was given 
in Shippers Development Co. v. General Insurance Co. of 
America.5 In that case, a produce dealer's truck driver, who 
had come onto the premises of the plaintiff supplier for the 
purpose of icing the produce in his employer's truck and trail-
er, was injured when he fell off the end of the supplier's dock 
after he got out of the truck but before he could open the trail-
er door for the purpose of icing the truck. The court held 
that his case came within the "complete operations"6 doc-
trine, and that the failure of a consignor or consignee, who is 
4. 273 Cal. App.2d 11, 15, 77 Cal. 
Rptr. 859, 862; see also American Auto. 
Ins. Co. v. American Fidelity and Cas-
ualty Co., 106 Cal. App.2d 630, 638, 
235 P.2d 645, 649 (1951). 
502 
5. 274 Cal. App. -, 79 Cal. Rptr. 
388 (1969). 
6. See Entz v. Fidelity and Casualty 
Company, 64 Cal.2d 379, 50 Cal. Rptr. 
190, 412 P.2d 382 (1966). 
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using a vehicle for loading or unloading, to maintain a safe 
place for that activity is an act or omission which has a 
causal relationship to the use of the vehicle so as to come 
within the terms of the truck policy. It looks more and more 
as though there is coverage for the homeowner whose child 
leaves a skate in the path of the milkman. 
II. Life Insurance 
A. Application Misrepresentation-Incontestable 
Clauses 
The furnishing of a copy of the application to the insured 
or to his beneficiary is not required by statute in California. 
In Metzinger v. Manhattan Life Insurance Company/ how-
ever, the insurer chose to enlarge the incontestable provisions 
required by Insurance Code section 10206, by providing, in a 
group life insurance policy and a certificate of individual in-
surance issued thereunder, that no statement made by the in-
sured relating to his insurability shall be used in contesting the 
validity of the insurance unless a copy of the application had 
been furnished to the insured or to his beneficiary. The Court 
properly ruled that the insurer could not escape the application 
of that provision most beneficial to the insured. The purpose 
of such a provision is to provide an opportunity to review 
the application while the insured is still alive, and to correct 
misstatements that might have appeared therein. The lan-
guage of the provision, the Court opined, was calculated to 
lead an insured to believe that if a copy of the application 
concerning his statements had not been furnished during his 
lifetime, such statements might not be relied on by the insurer 
after his death. 
B. Effective Date of Coverage-Accidental Death 
In Slobojan v. Western Traveler's Life Insurance Com-
pany,8 the State Supreme Court was faced with a situation 
7. 71 Cal.2d 423, 78 Cal. Rptr. 463, 8. 70 Cal.2d 432, 74 Cal. Rptr. 895, 
455 P.2d 391 (1969). 450 P.2d 271 (1969). 
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where an individual died after signing an application for life 
insurance but before accepting delivery of the policy. As 
might be expected, the insurer, confronted with the realization 
that the risk was not as desirable as it had first seemed, chose 
to contest the claim by asserting that the policy had not gone 
into effect. This effort to evade coverage was summarily re-
jected on motion for summary judgment granted in favor of 
the claimant. The Supreme Court affirmed. 
Plaintiff's decedent signed defendant's application for life 
insurance in the amount of $25,000, with double indemnity 
covering accidental death with respect to the first $5,000. He 
paid the first month's premium of $16.14 by check, which 
defendant deposited in its account. Defendant's agent ex-
plained to him that the insurance would not take effect until 
the application was accepted by the company and a policy 
issued and accepted by him and that he would be required to 
take a physical examination. The decedent took the physical 
examination at defendant's request; and on the same date, de-
fendant issued the policy and forwarded it to its agent. The 
agent thereupon notified decedent that the policy was ready to 
be delivered but that the premium for double indemnity would 
be $.44 per month higher, since he was a police officer who 
made arrests. Decedent told the agent that he had been in-
quiring about other policies and would let her know whether 
or not he wished to accept defendant's policy. Five days later 
he died. On the reverse side of a "conditional receipt" given 
to the decedent for his first premium was language indicating 
that payment of the first month's premium on date of applica-
tion would put the policy into effect on either the date of 
application or date of medical examination, whichever was 
later. The Court gave effect to the language in the "condi-
tional receipt," and held that the contract of insurance arose 
on the insurer's receipt of the completed application and the 
first premium payment. In so holding, the Court followed its 
opinion in Ransom v. Penn Mutual Life Insurance Company,9 
where the Court stated: 
9. 43 Ca1.2d 420, 274 P.2d 633 
(1954). 
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The understanding of an ordinary person is the stand-
ard which must be used in construing the contract, and 
such a person upon reading the application would believe 
that he would secure the benefit of immediate coverage 
by paying the premium in advance of delivery of the 
policy. There is an obvious advantage to the company 
in obtaining payment of the premium when the applica-
tion is made, and it would be unconscionable to permit 
the company, after using language to induce payment 
of the premium at that time, to escape the obligation 
which an ordinary applicant would reasonably believe 
had been undertaken by the insurer. Moreover, defend-
ant drafted the clause, and had it wished to make clear 
that its satisfaction was a condition precedent to a con-
tract, it could easily have done so by using unequivocal 
terms. 10 
The company's effort to avoid the double-indemnity ac-
cidental death provision likewise met with failure. On the 
date Mr. Slobojan died, he was on regular duty as a deputy 
sheriff and started a chase on foot after a crime suspect. The 
chase involved running and fence climbing, and while so en-
gaged, he tripped and fell. An autopsy disclosed a pre-exist-
ing mild atherosclerosis, but that such condition was non-
manifest and nondisabling. The trial court found that the 
chase created an unusual physical stress and strain on the de-
cedent's entire body, which was involuntary, reasonably un-
expected and unanticipated by him, and resulted in injury, 
accidental in origin. The accidental death provision stated 
that the death must result "directly and independently of all 
other causes from bodily injuries caused by accident" and 
must not have resulted from "disease" or "bodily or mental 
infirmity." The Court affirmed the holding of "accidental 
death," restating the rule in Brooks v. Metropolitan Life Ins. 
Co./1 that: 
The correct rule is that the presence of preexisting 
10. 43 Ca1.2d 420, 425, 274 P.2d 11. 27 Ca1.2d 305, 163 P.2d 689 
633, 636. (1945). 
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disease or infirmity will not relieve the insurer from lia-
bility if the accident is the proximate cause of death; 
and that recovery may be had even though a diseased 
or infirm condition appears to actually contribute to 
cause the death if the accident sets in progress the chain 
of events leading directly to death, or if it is the prime 
or moving cause.12 
III. Insurance and the Adhesion Contract Doctrine 
As indicated earlier in this article, the doctrine of adhesion 
contract has been utilized by the State Supreme Court in de-
termining the reasonable application of language contained in 
insurance policies. It is likewise interesting to note the ap-
plication of the doctrine by the Courts of Appeal in dealing 
with cases where an insurer is attempting to defeat the reason-
able expectation of its insured through technical language 
buried in the policy. Running through these cases appears to 
be the element of fairness, which the courts utilize in reaching 
a result that comports with the reasonable expectation of the 
insured. 
In Schmidt v. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company,t3 
the insurer attempted to limit its monthly disability benefits, 
in an accident and disability insurance policy, to disabilities 
"commencing . . . within twenty days after the date of the 
accident." The insured's disability did not start until 75 days 
after his accident; and under rules of strict application of con-
tract language, his claim would be denied. Indeed, that was 
the ruling of the trial court. However, the Court of Appeal re-
versed judgment with directions to enter judgment for the in-
sured. It did so on the basis that the limitation unexpectedly 
and inharmoniously appeared as a subsidiary clause in a sea 
of print, preceded and followed by the policy's emphasis on 
the insurer's major promises as to the benefits to be paid in the 
event of total disability. In refusing to apply the buried lan-
guage, the court stated: 
12. 27 Cal.2d 305, 309-310,163 P.2d 13. 268 Cal. App.2d 735, 74 Cal. 
689, 691. Rptr. 367 (1969). 
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We do not dispute respondent's right to insert in its con-
tracts of insurance a provision that will limit a buyer's 
right to recover benefits to those cases where total dis-
ability is caused'. . . within twenty days after the date 
of the accident.' We merely say that where, as here, such 
an exclusionary provision disappoints the reasonable ex-
pectations of the buyer, and fails to pass the '. . . con-
spicuous, plain and clear . . .' test prescribed by our 
Supreme Court, it cannot operate to defeat the buyer's 
rights. 14 
Another illustration of this principle may be found in Oil 
Base, Inc. v. Continental Casualty Company/5 where an in-
surer attempted to limit its general comprehensive liability in-
surance policy to "accidents which occur during the policy 
period within the United States of America, its territories or 
possessions, or Canada." The insured, during the policy pe-
riod, sold some bags of its drilling mud to a South American 
company; and while the mud was stored in a warehouse be-
longing to the purchaser in Venezuela, it caught fire from spon-
taneous combustion. The company attempted to avoid cov-
erage on the basis that the accident had occurred in Venezuela. 
Here too, the trial court ruled in favor of the insurer; and once 
again, judgment was reversed on appeal. The reviewing 
court found an ambiguity in the word "accident" and, more 
significantly, applied the doctrine of adhesion contract in find-
ing in favor of the insured. In doing so, the court noted that 
the insured was charged and paid premiums on its gross busi-
ness, foreign and domestic, and did not know that the exclu-
sion clause was in the contract. Under such circumstances, 
although the court was sensitive to the fact that the exclusion 
clause was not in fine print, it was still persuaded that the 
principles set forth in Gray v. Zurich Insurance Compani6 
applied; and it held that the insurer had wrongfully refused to 
defend its insured. 
14. 268 Cal. App.2d 735, 740, 74 Cal. 16. 65 Cal.2d 263, 54 Cal. Rptr 
Rptr. 367, 370. 104, 419 P.2d 168 (1966). 
15. 271 Cal. App.2d 378, 76 Cal. 
Rptr. 594 (1969). 
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Finally, of particular interest in view of the Supreme Court's 
decision in Slobojan v. Western Travelers' Life Insurance 
Company/7 is the case of Young v. Metropolitan Life Insur-
ance Company/8 which also dealt with the question of a con-
ditional receipt given by a life insurance agent to an applicant 
after payment of the premium but before issuance of the 
policy. In Young, the court found that the language of the 
conditional receipt was not ambiguous and misleading, where 
it emphatically stated that the policy applied for would become 
effective "if and only if" all conditions "precedent" thereafter 
enumerated in the same paragraph had been complied with, 
and then made it reasonably clear that the only coverage pro-
vided to the applicant during the interim was an accidental 
death benefit. The court stated that it could not be said that 
the applicant, presumably a person of ordinary intelligence, 
would have been misled into believing that he was immediately 
covered by the insurance policy applied for if he had been 
aware of the pertinent clause contained in the application and 
if he had carefully read the conditional receipt. Nevertheless, 
the court reversed judgment in favor of the insurer on the 
ground that there was no evidence (nor a court finding) that 
the limited interim coverage contained in the conditional re-
ceipt was ever called to the insured's attention. There was 
evidence that the agent of the company had filled out the part 
of the application containing the clause on the deceased's be-
half and then secured his signature. There was also evidence 
that the deceased first mistakenly signed the application under 
the medical part, thus indicating that he had not read it; and 
also that after he signed the proper part of the application, he 
immediately paid the premium and was handed the conditional 
receipt by the agent, apparently without comment. In ruling 
in favor of the beneficiary to the policy, the court stated: 
It is now firmly settled that insurance contracts are con-
tracts of adhesion between parties not equally situated. 
(citations) Consequently, the insurer, as the dominant 
17. 70 Cal.2d 432, 74 Cal. Rptr. 18. 272 Cal. App.2d 453, 77 Cal. 
895, 450 P.2d 271 (1969), discussed Rptr. 382, 78 Cal. Rptr. 568 (1969). 
supra. 
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and expert party in the field, must not only draft such 
contracts in unambiguous terms but must bring to the 
attention of the insured all provisions and condition 
which create exceptions or limitations on the coverage. 
(citations) Manifestly, it should have even a greater 
duty to call attention to such provisions or conditions 
when they are contained in receipts given to an applicant 
after he has paid the premium in advance, because the 
very acceptance of an advance premium by the carrier 
tends naturally toward an understanding of immediate 
coverage though it be temporary and terminable. (cita-
tion) In short, to the ordinary layman, payment of the 
insurance premium constitutes payment for immediate 
protection, and it is unlikely that he would carefully read 
the fine print contained in a receipt unless he was given 
the incentive to do so by the carrier's agent.19 
This writer believes that the approach taken by the courts 
in the above cases is salutary and to be commended. He like-
wise hopes that these principles are applied with equal force 
in other areas of adhesion contracts, where the consumer needs 
just as much protection. All too often, the individual who 
has borrowed money discovers the existence of a "due-on-sale" 
clause or a pre-payment penalty which it would be unconscion-
able to apply. Yet, the courts have given effect to such provi-
sions contained in adhesion contracts, notwithstanding the 
punitive effect of the clause and the fact that the clause was 
not called to the attention of the borrower at the time the 
contract was entered into. If the doctrine of adhesion con-
tract is to receive its full flower, it cannot and should not be 
limited to the insurance field. 
19. 272 Cal. App.2d 453,460-461,77 
Cal. Rptr. 382, 387, 78 Cal. Rptr. 568. 
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